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TODD WAYNE MULDER, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
V. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Re span.dent/ Appellee. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Todd Wayne Mulder appeals the denial of his petition for post-
conviction relief, wherein he collaterally challenged his convictions for 
murder, aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping. This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated§ 78A-3-102(3)G) (West 2009). 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 24, 2003, Daniel Campbell walked into a coin store in 
St. George, shot the owner in the chest, bound him, and then stole coins and 
1noney from the store's safe. The owner later died from his wounds. 
Months later, police learned that Todd Mulder helped plan the 
robbery, was Campbell's getaway driver, and shared in the robbery 
proceeds. A jury convicted Mulder of 1nurder, aggravated robbery, and 
aggravated kidnapping, and this Court affirmed those convictions on 
appeal. 
Mulder then filed a post-conviction action collaterally challenging his 
convictions. The dish·ict court below denied all of Mulder's claims on 
summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. At trial, Campbell and another accomplice both testified about 
Mulder's role in the crimes. In his post-conviction petition, Mulder argued 
that he was entitled to relief based on newly discovered evidence- namely, 
an affidavit from Campbell in which Campbell claimed that Mulder had 
nothing to do with the crime. The dish·ict court granted summary judgment 
on this claim, reasoning that this was mere impeachment evidence and 
would not make it impossible for a reasonable jury to have convicted. 
Was this ruling correct? 
2. Mulder claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not 
arguing that trial counsel should have requested a cautionary jury 
instruction about the accomplices' testimony. The dish·ict court granted 
summary judgment, reasoning that Mulder was not entitled to such an 
instruction under the governing statute. 
Was this ruling correct? 
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© 
had proffered no specific evidence about who those witnesses were or what 
they would have said. 
Was this ruling correct? 
7. Mulder claimed that his appellate counsel should have argued that 
h·ial counsel improperly prevented Mulder from presenting his preferred 
vJ defense. The district court granted summary judgment on this because the 
record shows that trial counsel presented the very defense that Mulder 
requested. 
Was this ruling correct? 
Standard of Review: Review is for correctness. See Honie v. State, 2014 
UT 19, if 28,342 P.3d 182. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following are reproduced in Addendum A: 
• Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-104 (West 2009); 
e Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106 (West 2009). 
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3. Mulder claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not 
arguing that the trial prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony. The 
district court granted surmnary judgment on this claim because Mulder had 
proffered no evidence showing that the testhnony at issue was false or that 
the prosecutor knew of its alleged falsity. 
Was this ruling correct? 
4. Mulder claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not 
arguing that Mulder's trial counsel should have asked prospective jurors 
about their religious affiliation. The district court granted summary 
judgment, reasoning that there was no legal basis for asking those questions 
in this case. 
Was this ruling correct? 
5. Mulder claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not 
arguing that Mulder's trial counsel should have moved to strike four jurors. 
The district court granted summary judgment, reasoning that there was no 
basis for sh·iking any of them. 
Was this ruling correct? 
6. Mulder claimed that his appellate counsel should have argued that 
h·ial counsel was ineffective for not subpoenaing additional alibi witnesses. 
The district court granted sum1nary judgment on this claim because Mulder 
-3-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Underlying Crime 
In the fall of 2003, Todd Mulder was living with his girlfriend Lori 
Schlegel. R253:115. At the time, Mulder was on parole after serving a 
lengthy prison sentence for armed robbery. R255:558-59. 
Schlegel lived off a small monthly disability check. R253:115. She 
also made money helping Mulder commit burglaries. R253:115-16. This 
didn't amount to much, though, and Mulder and Schlegel still "needed 
money." R255:610. Schlegel and Mulder decided to sell a set of coins that 
Schlegel had obtained, so they took her coins to the Allgood Coin Shop in 
St. George and met with Jordan Allgood, the shop's owner. R253:118-19. 
After spending two days going through the coins, Allgood paid cash for the 
coins. R253:120, 122. While they were there, Schlegel noticed that Allgood 
had reh·ieved the cash from a safe behind his counter and had left the safe 
unlocked. R253:122. 
In early November 2003, Mulder had a chance 1neeting with Daniel 
Campbell, whom he knew from a prison stint in Nevada. R253:171. At the 
time of this 1neeting, Campbell had recently absconded fron1 a court-
ordered halfway house and was on the run. R253:125-26, 173. 
1 The State will cite to the record fro1n the criminal case (case no. 
051501050) as R-' and the record from the post-conviction case as PCR_. 
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Campbell began spending time at Schlegel and Mulder's aparhnent. 
R253:126-27, 384; 255:564. While Campbell was there one day, Schlegel 
mentioned the Allgood Coin Shop and said that Allgood was "sitting on a 
gold mine." R253:128. 
Campbell and Mulder decided to rob the coin shop. Campbell 
suggested that he and Mulder enter the store together, but Mulder pointed 
out that Allgood would "know [him]" because he had been inside the store 
several times. R253:186. They agreed that Campbell would rob the store, 
while Mulder would act as the getaway driver. R253:186, 193. 
The two obtained a wig and coat for Campbell to use as a disguise. 
R253:138. They also obtained walkie-talkies to communicate, as well as duct 
tape and handcuffs to restrain Allgood. R253:137, 200. Campbell wanted to 
carry a stun gun, R253:137, 182, but Mulder insisted that Campbell use a 
pistol that Mulder had recently obtained. R253:183, 196. Mulder also 
instructed Campbell to "be a lion" when he went inside- i.e., to "go in and 
be forceful, take control of the situation immediately." R253:202. 
On November 24, 2003, Mulder, Campbell, and Schlegel drove to 
Mesquite, Nevada, in Schlegel' s truck, and checked in together at a local 
hotel under Schlegel' s na1ne. R253:142-43. The next morning, Campbell put 
his disguise on in front of Mulder and Schlegel. R253:143. Mulder and 
-6-
Campbell then drove to St. George. R253:144. Mulder dropped Campbell 
off a short distance from the coin store. R253:215. 
Campbell entered the store and began "screaming and yelling." 
R253:217. Allgood was on the phone at the time. Id. When Allgood looked 
at Campbell "kind of funny," Campbell shot him once in the chest. 
R253:217-19. Campbell wanted to make sure that the wounded Allgood 
could not interfere with the robbery, so he handcuffed Allgood's hands 
behind his back. R253:220. 
As expected, the safe was unlocked. Id. Campbell loaded two duffel 
bags full of coins and money, radioed Mulder that he was ready to be 
picked up, and left. R253:222-23. When Campbell got inside the h·uck, he 
told Mulder that he had shot Allgood in the shoulder. R253:224. Mulder 
told him not to call 911. R253:225. Allgood died a short time later. R263:33. 
Mulder drove Campbell back to the hotel romn and then divided the 
coins and money. R253:248-49. As part of their share, Mulder and Schlegel 
received two cougarans, which are one-ounce gold coins, as well as "'lots of 
silver coins." R253:148, 150. 
Two days after the robbery and 1nurder, Mulder and Schlegel went to 
a pawn shop in Las Vegas to sell one of the cougarans. R253:154, 253; 
254:376. Campbell approached them unannounced in the parking lot and 
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told them that he had sold a cougaran at that same pawn shop earlier that 
day. R253:156, 253. Mulder was concerned that this would attract attention. 
R253:156. He offered Campbell $3000 for the coins that Campbell still had 
from the robbery. R253:158, 255. Mulder told Campbell to "take the $3000 
and get out of here. We don't want to ever know who you are, we don't 
want to see you again." R253:158. Mulder also said: "Man, you need to 
watch your back and you need to keep your mouth shut." Id. 
In the months following this crime, Campbell and Mulder were both 
reincarcerated on different offenses, but officers had not linked them to the 
Allgood murder. R. 263: 53-55, 68, 74-75. In October 2004, officers received 
a tip that Campbell had confessed his involve1nent in this crime to a fellow 
inmate and that Campbell had also implicated a former cellmate named 
"Todd" and "Todd's" girlfriend. R263:55-62. 
Officers followed up on this lead and were ulthnately led to Todd 
Mulder, Campbell, and Schlegel. During subsequent interviews, Ca1npbell 
and Schlegel both adrn.itted their involve1nent in the crime, and both of 
them claimed that Mulder was involved in its planning and execution; 
when interviewed in jail, however, Mulder denied that he was involved. 
R253:164-66, 266; 263:72-73, 75. 
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Trial 
Mulder was charged with murder, aggravated robbery, and 
aggravated kidnapping. Rl-3. 
At trial, Schlegel and Campbell both testified and implicated Mulder 
in the crime. The State also introduced a video of the shooting taken from 
the coin shop's security camera. R263:37-38. It showed Campbell 
approaching the store's door after the shooting and "motioning out to 
someone" outside. R263:50. In addition, the State presented evidence 
showing that Schlegel had paid for a room in Mesquite the night before the 
crime, as well as a receipt showing that Mulder had sold a gold coin at a Las 
Vegas pawn shop two days after the homicide. R254:376. 
Mulder also agreed to a stipulated set of facts that acknowledged 
Campbell's role in the robbery and shooting, Campbell's prior relationship 
with Mulder from prison, and that Mulder and Schlegel had purchased 
Campbell's remaining coins after the shooting. R174-76. 
Mulder testified in his own behalf. In his testimony, Mulder 
acknowledged having been in Allgood' s shop several times with Schlegel, 
as well as hearing Schlegel refer to it as a "gold 1nine." R255:556-61. He 
also acknowledged having met up with Ca1npbell a few weeks before the 
-9-
robbery, as well as being with Schlegel and Campbell when the idea of 
robbing the Allgood store came up. R255:565. 
Mulder clahned, however, that it was Schlegel' s idea to rob the store 
and that she had black1na:iled him into participating in the planning. 
R255:572, 621. He acknowledged that he helped Campbell obtain the 
disguise and that he watched Ca1npbell don it that morning, but he claimed 
that he did so only because of Schlegel' s blackmail. Id. 
Mulder denied doing anything else with respect to the robbery or 
shooting. According to Mulder, Campbell drove off alone to rob the coin 
shop, while he spent the morning attempting to sell stolen jewelry in 
Mesquite. R255:573, 581, 583-94, 610. Mulder claimed that when Ca1npbell 
returned, Ca1npbell and Schlegel divided the stolen coins together without 
his participation. R255:599. On cross-exa1nination, however, Mulder 
admitted that he received some of the resulting proceeds through Schlegel, 
that he pawned a gold coin two days after the robbery, and that he 
purchased Ca1npbell' s remaining coins. R255:605, 631-32. 
The jury convicted Mulder on all counts. R213-16. 
Direct appeal 
Mulder's appellate counsel raised two claims on direct appeal: first, 
that h·ial counsel should have argued that the aggravated kidnapping 
-10- @, 
n1erged into the aggravated robbery; and second, that trial counsel should 
have moved to dismiss the aggravated kidnapping charge for insufficient 
evidence. State v. Mulder, 2009 UT App 318 at *1 (unpublished). This Court 
rejected both claims. Id. at *1-3. 
Post-Conviction 
On August 25, 2010, Mulder filed a petition for post-conviction relief. 
Mulder raised 29 claims, most of which alleged that his trial counsel was 
ineffective. See generally PCR29-121. He also alleged that his appellate 
counsel was ineffective for not raising those claims on appeal. PCRl 19. In 
addition, Mulder alleged that he was entitled to relief based on newly 
discovered evidence. In support, he proffered an affidavit from Campbell 
in which Campbell recanted some of his trial testimony. PCR78-91. 
The district court directed the State to only respond to the appellate 
ineffective assistance and newly discovered evidence claims. PCR170-71, 
290-91. The State moved for summary judg1nent on all claims. The later 
court granted the State's 1notion. PCR561-70 (Addendu1n B). In its written 
ruling, the court noted that because it was "persuaded ahnost entirely" by 
the State's arguments, it would "not indulge in much analysis 
of the issues." PCR561-62. The court instead "provide[d] only" a brief 
"summary of the issues" and the basis for its rulings. PCR562. 
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Mulder appeals the denial of his petition. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Mulder sought relief under the PCRA' s newly discovered 
evidence provision. He relied on an affidavit from Daniel Campbell in 
which Campbell recanted his trial testimony, now claiming that Mulder had 
nothing to do with this crime. 
The district court correctly ruled that the proffered testimony failed as 
a matter of law to support post-conviction relief based on newly discovered 
evidence. First, Campbell's recantation would be mere impeachment 
evidence that does not justify post-conviction relief. Second, a reasonable 
juror could still vote to convict Mulder, either by disregarding Campbell's 
recantation, or even by disregarding Campbell's testimony entirely and 
convicting based on Schlegel's testimony and the other evidence. 
Point II: Mulder claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for 
not arguing that trial counsel should have requested a cautionary 
instruction about the weight that should be given to the testhnony of his 
accomplices. 
The district court correctlv concluded that the claitn failed as a matter 
J 
of law. The conh·olling statute requires such an instruction only when an 
individual accomplice's testimony is uncorroborated. That is not the case 
-12-
here, where Campbell and Schlegel corroborated each other, and where 
their joint account at trial was partially corroborated by Mulder's own 
testimony and by other physical evidence. 
Point III: Mulder claims that his appellate counsel should have 
argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct by presenting false 
testimony from Schlegel. Mulder relies on a change in Schlegel' s 
testimony-namely, at the preliminary hearing, Schlegel said that she had 
not seen Mulder with a gun, but at trial, she said that she remembered 
seeing Mulder with a gun several weeks after this crime. 
To prevail on this claim, however, Mulder must point to evidence in 
the record showing both that the evidence was false and that the prosecutor 
knew of its falsity. The record does not prove either of these things. Thus, 
there was no basis for appellate counsel to have raised this claims. 
Point IV: Mulder claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for 
not arguing that trial counsel should have asked jurors about their religious 
affiliation. But under conh·olling law, such questions would have been 
appropriate only if religion were "clearly relevant" to this case. It was not 
here, because the events in question did not take place in a church, implicate 
a church, and no witness or actor's religion was ever mentioned to the jury. 
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Mulder also argues that his appellate counsel should have argued 
that his trial counsel was somehow complicit in ensuring that non-Mormons 
were not seated on this jury. But nothing in the record supports this clailn. 
To the contrary, the record shows that neither counsel nor the court were 
aware of jurors' religious affiliation, let alone involved in an effort to 
exclude members (or non-members) of any religion from the jury. 
Point V: Mulder claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for 
not arguing that h~ial counsel should have moved to strike four jurors for 
cause. But in each instance, the record shows that juror in question was not 
actually biased against Mulder. Because of this, Mulder has not shown that 
he was prejudiced. 
Moreover, to overcome the presumption of effectiveness in this 
context, Mulder must prove that a juror's bias against him was so strong 
that his counsel could not have had any plausible countervailing subjective 
preference for keeping the juror. In this case, however, all of the jurors in 
question were cmnpetent to serve, and several gave answers in voir dire 
that were potentially favorable to Mulder's position. The district court 
therefore correctly concluded that Mulder did not carry his burden. 
Point VI: Mulder claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for 
not arguing that trial counsel should have subpoenaed additional alibi 
-14-
witnesses. But nothing in the record identifies who the additional witnesses 
could have been or what they could have said to support Mulder's alibi. 
Thus, there was no basis for appellate counsel to have made this claim, nor 
is there any proof that Mulder was prejudiced by its absence. 
Point VII: Finally, Mulder claims that his appellate counsel was 
ineffective for not arguing that trial counsel should have been removed 
based on an unwillingness to present Mulder's desired defense. But the 
trial record shows that Mulder was allowed to present the very defense he 
desired. Thus, there was no prejudicial error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The district court correctly granted summary judgment on the 
newly discovered evidence claim because Mulder's proffer 
presented mere impeachment evidence that was not enough 
to prevent a reasonable juror from convicting Mulder. 
Mulder first argues that the district court erred in granting the State's 
request for summary judg1nent. on his newly discovered evidence claim. 
Aplt. Br. 17-22. 
Under the PCRA, a petitioner is entitled to relief if he presents newly 
discovered evidence that II is not 111erely ilnpeachment evidence" and, 
"viewed with all the other evidence ... den1onstrates that no reasonable 
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trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty" of the underlying 
offense. Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-104(1)(e)(iii), (iv) (West 2009). 
A district court must grant summary judgment if "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(c). Summary judgment 
serves a "salutary purpose in our procedure because it eliminates the time, 
trouble and expense of a trial, when upon the best showing the plaintiff can 
possibly make, he would not be entitled to a judgment." Brandt v. 
Springville Banking Co., 353 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah 1960). Summary judgment 
on behalf of the State in a post-conviction case is entirely appropriate. Rule 
65C(k), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, expressly contemplates it, and Utah 
appellate courts have repeatedly affirmed grants of sum1nary judgment in 
such cases. See, e.g., Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, ,I49, 267 P.3d 232 
(" courts rule on sum1nary judgment motions in PCRA cases all the time"). 
A. Additional procedural background. 
Mulder sought post-conviction relief based on newly discovered 
evidence. In support, he submitted an affidavit from Daniel Campbell in 
which Can1pbell attested that "Mulder was irn1ocent of all charges" and that 
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he had previously "lied about [Mulder's] involvement." Campbell Affidavit. 2 
Campbell also claimed that he had "trick[ed]" Mulder and Schlegel uinto 
going to Mesquite, Nev. under false pretenses." Id. He claimed that on the 
day of the murder, he dropped Mulder off at a shopping complex, and that 
Campbell then "went to St. George and did the armed robbery ... 
completely alone." Id. 
The district court denied the claim. It first noted the possibility that 
this may have been impeachment evidence-and therefore incapable of 
satisfying the PCRA's newly discovered evidence standard. PCR564. But 
the court declined to rule on that basis. Instead, it held that, when "viewed 
with all the other evidence," Campbell's post-conviction proffer "certainly" 
would "not demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact would find 
[Mulder] guilty." PCR565. The court noted that Campbell's affidavit 
conh·adicted both his trial testimony and Mulder's trial testimony. See id. 
The court also noted that Campbell's recantation "would have little 
credibility because Daniel Campbell would clearly be admitting that he lied 
under oath at Petitioner's first trial." Id. The court also noted that the jury 
2 This affidavit was attached as one of the attachments to Mulder's 
petition, see PCR78, but the district court did not include Mulder's 
attachments in the appellate record. Mulder has also attached this affidavit 
as Attachment C to his brief. The State will cite to it as Campbell Affidavit. 
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would still have had Schlegel' s testimony and physical evidence that 
hnplicated Mulder. Id. 
B. The district court correctly granted summary judgment on this 
claim because Campbell's affidavit was mere impeachment 
evidence and would not make it so that no reasonable juror 
could convict. 
1. This was mere impeachment evidence. 
Although the district court declined to rule on whether this was mere 
impeachment evidence, this Court can- and should - affirm on this basis. 
See Madsen v. Washington Mut. Bank, FSB, 2008 UT 69,_ ~26, 199 P.3d 898 
("When reviewing a decision made on one ground, we have the discretion 
to affirm the judgment on an alternative ground if it is apparent in the 
record." (emphasis omitted)). 
Here, Campbell's post-conviction account merely contradicted a 
separate account. If he had smnehow given it before trial, its only use 
would have been to impeach his trial testimony. As noted, however, the 
PCRA precludes relief where the newly discovered evidence is "merely 
impeachment evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(1)(e)(iii). Because of 
this, Mulder was not entitled to relief and this Court may affirm on this 
alternative basis alone. 
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2. Mulder's proffer failed as a matter of law to establish that 
no reasonable juror could have convicted Mulder. 
To succeed on this claim, Mulder also had to establish that if the 
newly discovered evidence is "viewed with all the other evidence," "no 
reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty" of the 
offense. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(1)(e)(iv). There are several reasons 
why Campbell's affidavit falls far short of this. 
First, a jury could choose to disbelieve it. As noted, Campbell's new 
account conflicts with the sworn testimony that he gave at trial. Thus, at 
most, this affidavit creates a credibility contest between Campbell (now) 
and Campbell (before). But a jury could rationally choose to believe 
Campbell's earlier account, rather than his new one, so this affidavit does 
satisfy the conh·olling standard. 
Second, this affidavit also conflicts with the account Mulder gave at 
trial. As noted, Campbell now takes full responsibility for this crime. He 
asserts that he "lied about [Mulder]' s involvement in 1ny crin1e" at trial and 
claims that he "h·ick[ed] Mulder" and Schlegel "into going to Mesquite, 
Nev. under false pretenses." Campbell Affidavit. Campbell thus claims that 
he "did it completely alone." Id. 
But this is not what Mulder said at trial. At trial, Mulder testified that 
it was Schlegel, not Campbell, who was the mastermind and driving force 
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behind this crime. Mulder testified that it was Schlegel who first brought 
up the idea of robbing the coin shop. R255:565. Mulder testified that 
Schlegel blackmailed him into participating. R255:572-73. Mulder testified 
that Schlegel provided the money for obtaining a wig and fake beard. 
R255:576. Mulder testified that after Campbell returned from the robbery, 
Schlegel and Campbell divided the proceeds equally between them. 
R255:599. Mulder thus claimed that this crime "was her baby." R255:619. 
Thus, if Campbell's recantation were introduced at a retrial, it would 
not necessarily exonerate Mulder. Rather, it could actually undermine 
Mulder's defense by contradicting his own sworn version of what 
happened. 
Third, the jury could also still convict based on Lori Schlegel' s 
testimony, wherein Schlegel testified that Mulder actively and voluntarily 
participated in the planning and execution of this crhne. See generally 
R253:129-48. 
Notably, other sources-including Mulder himself-corroborated 
1nuch of Schlegel's account. For example, Schlegel testified that Mulder and 
Cainpbell obtained the disguise for Campbell to use in the robbery; Mulder 
acknowledged this. R255:610. Schlegel clahned that Mulder watched 
Campbell put on the disguise the morning of the murder; Mulder 
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acknowledged this. R255:611. Schlegel claimed that Mulder and Campbell 
left that morning in her truck; Mulder acknowledged this. R255:610-11. 
Schlegel claimed that when Mulder left, he told her that he was going to St. 
George to assist Campbell in the robbery; Mulder acknowledged this. 
R255:627-28. Finally, Schlegel claimed that, two days after the robbery, 
Mulder pawned off one of the stolen gold coins at a pawn shop; Mulder 
acknowledged this. R255:631. 
Unlike Mulder and Campbell, Schlegel does not have a long history 
of convictions for crimes of dishonesty. Thus, Schlegel was likely the most 
credible of the three conspirators, and even with the Campbell affidavit, her 
testimony still remains largely corroborated. Because a jury could still 
reasonably choose to believe her, Campbell's recantation does not so alter 
the evidentiary picture that no reasonable jury could have convicted 
Mulder. 
In his brief, Mulder nevertheless argues that under Julian v. State, 2002 
UT 61, 52 P.3d 1168, a newly discovered evidence claim does not 
automatically fail when one wib1ess recants, but another does not. Aplt. Br. 
17-19. 
But Julian analyzed this question under the standard that existed 
"under the post-conviction relief case law in effect prior to the enactment of 
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the PCRA." Julian, 2002 UT 61, if 13 ( emphasis added). Under that previous 
standard, a petitioner was entitled to relief if there was "a substantial 
likelihood of a different result on retrial." Id. at if21. Julian expressly 
recognized that this was a lesser standard than the PCRA's current "no 
reasonable h·ier of fact" standard. Id. at if17 (recognizing that under the 
prior standard, the evidence "need not rise to the level of insuring that no 
reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty"). 
Under the current standard, however, a petitioner can obtain relief 
only if no reasonable juror could still convict. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-
104(1)(e)(iv). Here, a reasonable juror could choose to disregard Campbell's 
recantation and convict Mulder based on all the other evidence, including 
Schlegel' s sworn testimony. The district court therefore correctly dismissed 
this claim under the governing standard. 
In any event, even on its own terms, Julian does not compel a different 
result. In dicta, Julian suggested that if a trial wih1ess later recants, that 
recantation might satisfy the old newly discovered standard if the 
recantation was able to "negate an essential elen1ent of the State's case" or be 
used for "some other non-impeachment purpose." Julian, 2002 UT 61, ,l20 
(emphasis added). 
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If there is inculpatory evidence from other sources, however, one 
witness's recantation could not logically "negate" an essential element of 
the State's case. In such a circumstance, the recantation' s value would thus 
be limited to impeaching the prior testimony. This is the case here, where 
Ca1npbell's recantation would have been counteracted by Schlegel's own 
independent account, Mulder's admissions at trial that he was involved in 
multiple aspects of this crime, and the physical evidence linking him to the 
criine (such as the receipt showing that he pawned some of the coins stolen 
during the robbery). Thus, even under Julian, this was not enough, and the 
district court did not err in dismissing this claim. 
II. 
Appellate counsel could reasonably decide to not argue that 
trial counsel was ineffective for not asking for a cautionary 
instruction about the accomplices' testimony. 
Mulder claimed below that his appellate counsel should have argued 
that trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a cautionary jury 
insh·uction about testimony from Mulder's accomplices. PCR91-97. The 
dish·ict court denied this claim, concluding that (1) Mulder was not entitled 
to such an instruction, and (2) its mnission did not prejudice hiln. PCR565-
66. Mulder challenges both aspects of that ruling. Aplt. Br. 22-26. 
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A. To prevail, Mulder would have been required to prove 
ineffective assistance of both appellate and trial counsel. 
The PCRA provides the "sole remedy for any person who challenges 
a conviction or sentence" following the conclusion of the direct appeal 
process. Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-102 (West 2009). Under§ 78B-9-106(1)(c), 
however, a petitioner is ineligible for relief on any claim that "could have 
been but was not raised at h·ial or on appeal." If a clahn is barred under this 
provision, however, the petitioner may still be eligible for relief if he shows 
that "the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(3). 
Here, Mulder claims that he received ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel when appellate counsel did not raise each trial counsel 
claim on direct appeal. See Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, if 25, 293 P.3d 345; Gregg 
v. State, 2012 UT 32, if 18, 279 P.3d 396 (to "succeed on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel clahn in a post-conviction petition for relief," a 
petitioner must "prove that he received ineffective assistance from both his 
trial counsel and his appellate counsel" (Emphasis added.)). To prove 
ineffective assistance fr01n appellate counsel, Mulder was required to prove 
"that appellate counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable conduct and that the deficient performance prejudiced [hiln]." 
Rhinehart v. State, 2012 UT App 322, ~10, 290 P.3d 921 (citation 01nitted). 
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To show deficient performance on the appellate counsel claim, 
Mulder had to prove more than just that counsel overlooked a meritorious 
clailn, because appellate counsel has no constitutional obligation to raise 
every non-frivolous issue. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). 
"Experienced advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the 
importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on 
one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." Id. at 751-52. 
That rule applies even when appellate counsel have the luxury of "no time 
or page limits" because a "brief that raises every colorable issue runs the 
risk of burying good arguments." Id. at 753; accord Butterfield v. Cook, 817 
P.2d 333, 336 (Utah App. 1991). Moreover, if a claim is meritless, appellate 
counsel has no obligation to include it. See, e.g., State v. Bedell, 2014 UT 1, 
9jf 24 n.25, 322 P.3d 697. 
To prove prejudice on this claim, Mulder was required to prove that 
there was a "reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's um·easonable 
failure ... , he would have prevailed on his appeal." Kell v. State, 2008 UT 
62, ,I25, 194 P.3d 913 (citation orn.itted). In other words, Mulder was 
required to show that the omitted claim "'would have likely resulted in 
reversal of his conviction."' Id. 
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With respect to the underlying h·ial counsel claim, appellate counsel 
would have been required to prove both deficient performance and 
prejudice. To prove deficient performance, appellate counsel would have 
been required to identify specific acts or omissions that fell outside 
reasonable professional judgment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88, 690 (1984). She would have had to overcome the "strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct [fell] within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689; see also Burt v. Titlow, 134 
S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013). Appellate counsel would have had to meet the burden 
"on the basis of the law in effect at the time of trial." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1228 (Utah 1993); accord Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, 176, 344 P.3d 581 
("Importantly, in assessing whether counsel's performance was deficient, 
we must look at the facts and law available to counsel at the ti1ne of the 
representation."). 
To prove prejudice, appellate counsel would have had to prove that 
there was "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694. He would have had to prove that the "likelihood of a 
different result" was "substantial, not just conceivable." Harrington v. 
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). Moreover, proof of prejudice "cannot be a 
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speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." State v. Munguia, 
2011 UT 5, ,I30, 253 P.3d 1082; accord State v. Bryant, 2012 UT App 264, if23, 
290 P.3d 33. 
B. The district court correctly denied this claim, where Mulder 
was not entitled to the cautionary instruction at issue. 
There are several reasons why the dish·ict court's ruling was correct. 
First, appellate counsel properly omitted this claim because Mulder 
was not so clearly entitled to an insh·uction that appellate counsel could 
have shown that all objectively reasonable trial counsel would have asked 
for it. Utah Code Annotated§ 77-17-7 (West 2004) states: 
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony 
of an accomplice. 
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury may 
be given to the effect that such uncorroborated testimony 
should be viewed with caution, and such an instruction 
shall be given if the trial judge finds the testimony of the 
accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or hnprobable. 
(Em.phasis added). 
Here, the accomplice testin1ony was corroborated. As an initial 
matter, there was testimony from two accomplices (Schlegel and Campbell), 
not just one. While both were accomplices, the statute refers to the 
testimony of "the accon1plice" in the singular. The plain language 
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implication is that a cautionary instruction is not warranted if there 1s 
testimony from multiple accomplices. 
Moreover, Mulder himself corroborated much of their testimony. 
Mulder admitted that he was in the Allgood coin shop several times with 
Schlegel before the crime, that he met with Campbell a few weeks before the 
robbery, and that he was with Schlegel and Campbell when the idea of 
robbing the store came up. R255:556-65. He admitted that he helped 
Campbell obtain a disguise for the robbery and that he was with Campbell 
as he donned his disguise that morning. R255:573, 581, 583-94, 610. Mulder 
admitted that he received some of the stolen coins after the robbery, 
pawned one of then1 two days after the robbery, and later purchased 
Campbell's remaining coins. R255:605, 631-32. The State also introduced 
corroborating physical evidence, such as receipts showing that Mulder had 
sold the gold coin. R254:377. 
Moreover, the statute only requires a court to give an instruction if 
the judge "finds the testimony of the accomplice to be self contradictory, 
uncertain or ilnprobable." Utah Code Ann.§ 77-17-7. Neither accomplice's 
testin1ony 1net this standard. Therefore, even if Mulder's trial counsel had 
requested the instruction, the trial court still retained discretion not to give 
it. 
-28- @ 
Second, Mulder also has not shown that appellate counsel could have 
proven Strickland prejudice on the trial ineffective assistance claim. Utah 
courts have repeatedly held that denying an accomplice-testimony 
cautionary instruction did not prejudice a defendant, particularly where the 
court instructed the jury to evaluate the witnesses' credibility and the 
credibility concerns associated with the accomplice were discussed at trial. 
See, e.g., State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1096 (Utah 1988); State v. Guzman, 
2004 UT App 211, if37, 95 P.3d 302; State v. Kingston, 2002 UT App 103, if 20, 
46 P.3d 761. 
This was the case here. The court explicitly instructed the jury to 
consider any witness's II possible bias or possible interest in the result of the 
trial, and any possible motive the witness may have to testify in a particular 
way." R197. The court also instructed the jury to consider whether any 
witness had given II self-contradicting testimony or was conh·adicted by 
other evidence." Id. 
Mulder's trial counsel then repeatedly highlighted the self-interest of 
both Schlegel and Campbell at h·ial. Counsel elicited testiinony that Schlegel 
had received full ilnmunity for her testimony and that Campbell was 
testifying pursuant to his own plea bargain as well. R253:90, 92, 108-09, 165; 
254:354. Mulder's counsel also called one of Campbell's fellow inmates, 
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who testified that Campbell had told him that he was testifying pursuant to 
a deal, as well as an expert witness on prison culture who testified that it 
would have been unlikely that Campbell would have testified without a 
deal. R254:386, 428-29. 
Given all this, a cautionary instruction "was simply not necessary to 
prompt the jury to question [the] veracity" of these two accomplices, 
because the testilnony had already "alerted the jury to [their] possible 
motive[s] for testifying with less than total candor." Guzman, 2004 UT App 
211, if37. 
In short, on these undisputed facts, trial counsel could reasonably 
conclude that the insh·uction was unwarranted or unlikely to be given. 
Likewise, on this record, it is unlikely that its omission undermined 
confidence in the outc01ne. The district court therefore correctly denied this 
claim. 
III. 
Appellate counsel could reasonably decide not to argue that 
trial counsel was ineffective for not arguing that the 
prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony from Lori 
Schlegel. 
At the preliminary hearing, Schlegel testified that she had never seen 
Mulder with a gun. R249:57-58. At trial, she initially repeated this, 
testifying that she had only seen Mulder with a stun gun, not the revolver 
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that was used in the Allgood shooting. R263:138. During further 
questioning, however, Schlegel said that she did recall helping Mulder 
dispose of a gun several weeks after the crime. R255:470, 490. Despite this 
change in testimony, Mulder's trial counsel did not argue to the judge that 
the prosecutor had committed misconduct by knowingly presenting false 
testimony. See generally R255:470-97. 
In his post-conviction petition, Mulder argued that Schlegel' s later 
testimony that she had seen Mulder with a gun was false; he further argued 
that appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that trial counsel 
should have alleged that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
knowingly presenting this false testimony. PCR108-10. The dish·ict court 
denied this claim, concluding that because Mulder's claim was not 
11 factually or legally correct," 11 it was not ineffective assistance for appellate 
counsel to fail to raise this issue on appeal." PCR568. 
That ruling was correct on several levels. 
First, appellate counsel did not perform deficiently by mnitting this 
claim, because the factual underpinnings for a prosecutorial n1isconduct 
claim would not have been "obvious from the trial record." Kell, 2008 UT 
62, if 42 (citation mnitted). To prevail on a prosecutorial misconduct claim, 
appellate counsel would have been required to demonstrate that the 
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prosecutor was" aware that testhnony [was] false" but presented it anyway. 
Larsen v. Davis Cnty., 2014 UT App 74, if4 n.3, 324 P.3d 641; accord State v. 
Gordon, 886 P.2d 112, 115 (Utah App. 1994). Moreover, counsel would have 
been obligated to do so based on the "facts ... available to counsel at the 
time of the representation." Menzies, 2014 UT 40, if 76. 
Here, Mulder has pointed to a contradiction in Schlegel' s testimony. 
But "[c]onh·adictions and changes in a witness's testimony alone do not 
constitute perjury and do not create an inference, let alone prove, that the 
prosecution knowingly presented perjured testimony." Tapia v. Tansy, 926 
F.2d 1554, 1563 (10th Cir. 1991); accord Knighton v. Mullin, 293 F.3d 1165, 
1174 (10th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Holladay, 566 F.2d 1018, 1019 
(5th Cir. 1978) ("Presentation of a witness who recants or contradicts his 
prior testimony is not to be confused with eliciting pe1jury."); United States 
v. Bortnovsky, 879 F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1989) (same). Thus, her contradiction, 
alone, would not have satisfied the standard. 
Second, nothing in the record proves that the testimony Mulder 
challenged (Schlegel' s later testhnony that she saw Mulder handle a gun) 
was actually false. At h·ial: Ca1npbell testified that Mulder gave him the 
gun that he used in the robbery. R253:183-85. Like Schlegel, Campbell 
testified that this gun was a six-shot revolver. R253:185; 255:490. Given 
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this, appellate counsel could reasonably have decided not to press a 
prosecutorial misconduct claim that would have required proof that this was 
false. 
Third, even if Schlegel did testify falsely, nothing in the record 
suggests that the prosecutor knew this and yet presented her testimony 
anyway. See Larsen, 2014 UT App 74, if4 n.3. Because of this, this claim 
would not have been obvious from the record and appellate counsel had no 
obligation to raise it. 
Finally, Mulder's proffer failed as a matter of law to prove prejudice. 
To prevail, appellate counsel would have been required to prove that the 
error was "substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable 
result." State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ,I22, 999 P.2d 7 (citation omitted). 
Here, the question involved in this claim would have been whether 
Schlegel actually saw Mulder handle a gun. But as noted, there was also 
testimony from Campbell corroborating Schlegel's claim that Mulder had a 
gun. More ilnportantly, there was also an array of evidence showing that 
Mulder was involved in the plam1ing and execution of this robbery and 
murder. Given all of this, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury 
would have acquitted Mulder if it had not heard Schlegel say that she saw 
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Mulder with a gun several weeks after this crime, and Mulder therefore has 
not proven that he was prejudiced by appellate counsel's decision to omit 
this clahn. The dish·ict court therefore correctly denied this claim. 
IV. 
Appellate counsel could reasonably decide not to argue that 
trial counsel was ineffective for not (1) questioning 
prospective jurors about religion or (2) arguing that there was 
an unconstitutional exclusion of non-Mormons from the jury. 
· In his post-conviction petition, Mulder claimed that appellate counsel 
was ineffective for not arguing that (1) Mulder's trial attorneys should have 
asked the jury pool questions about their religion so that they could attempt 
to ferret out religious-based bias against Mulder, and (2) there was an 
unconstitutional exclusion of non-Mormons from the jury. PCR30-44. The 
district court rejected both claims, concluding that (1) "inquiry into religious 
belief" would not have been permissible because religion was not "clearly 
relevant" to this case, and (2) there was "no evidence of any 
unconstitutional exclusion of non-Mormons from the jury." PCR562. 
A. Appellate counsel could reasonably decide not to argue that 
trial counsel should have asked jurors about religion. 
Mulder first faults his appellate counsel for failing to argue that trial 
counsel was ineffective for not asking potential jurors about their religious 
affiliation. Aplt. Br. 37-42. Mulder clahns that voir dire questions about 
their religious affiliation were warranted because, as a "non-LDS member," 
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he was "part of a distinct minority group in Washington County" whose 
"lifestyle conflict[ed] with LDS doctrine." Aplt. Br. 38-39. Mulder also 
claims that LDS jurors would have been biased against him because the 
victhn was an LDS bishop. Id. 
But appellate counsel was not obligated to raise what would have 
been a futile claim about trial counsel's performance during voir dire. nJury 
selection is more art than science," and there "are a multitude of inherently 
subjective factors typically constituting the sum and substance of an 
attorneys' judgments about prospective jurors.'' State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
76, if 21, 12 P.3d 92. Because of this, a trial attorney's "decisions during jury 
selection legitimately may be based on little 1nore than personal preference. 
Defense counsel acting on their own intuitions, or upon their clients' 
requests, clearly have the right to identify and prefer particular jurors 
without regard to any particular objective criterion or philosophy of jury 
selection." Id. at ~23. 
While Mulder may now believe that his trial counsel should have 
believed that me1nbers of the LDS Church were necessarily biased against 
him, his counsel was not required to share that particular philosophy of jury 
selection. The claim fails for this reason alone. 
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· In addition, even if trial counsel had believed that LDS members 
would make bad jurors in this case, he 1nost likely would have been 
precluded from getting into the jurors' religious affiliations because religion 
was not a relevant inquiry. Article I, section 4 of the Utah Constitution 
declares that no person shall be deemed "incmnpetent as a witness or juror 
on account of religious belief or the absence thereof." Utah courts have 
recognized that, in particular circumstances, religious beliefs might form 
"the basis for actual bias, prejudice, or impartiality'' for a particular juror. 
State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah 1984) (citation omitted). Because of 
this, "inquiry into potential jurors' religious affiliation may occasionally be 
permissible during voir dire" - but only when religion is" clearly relevant" to 
the case. State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, if74, 256 P.3d 1102 (emphasis 
added); accord State v. Flores, 2015 UT App 88, if if13-21, 784 Utah Adv. Rep. 
12. If the "possibility of actual bias stemming from religious beliefs" is not 
present in a case, "it is ordinarily inappropriate to inquire into venire 
1nembers' religious beliefs during voir dire." Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT 
App 152, if 13, 71 P.3d 601. 
In Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 758 P.2d 929, 931-34 (Utah App. 1988), for 
example, a party was allowed to ask about the jurors' religious affiliation 
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because the LDS Church was a party to the suit. In Depew, 2003 UT App 
152, ili114-34, the plaintiff was likewise allowed to ask questions about 
religion because the defendant was absent from trial serving an LDS 
mission. 
But as recognized by the district court below, religion was not 
"clearly relevant" here. PCR562. As noted, Mulder's first claim is that 
religion was clearly relevant because his "lifestyle conflict[ ed] with LDS 
doctrine." Aplt. Br. 38-39. Mulder provides little explanation for this in 
either his petition or his appellate brief. So far as the State can tell, Mulder 
appears to be arguing that his "lifestyle" made religion relevant because he 
is not LDS. PCR37. But no Utah decision has held that this, alone, makes 
religion "clearly relevant" to any case involving a non-Mormon. Thus, 
appellate counsel was not obligated to 1nake this claim. See Menzies, 2014 
UT 40, ~76. 
Alternatively, Mulder also seems to suggest that, because the jury 
would hear that he met Campbell in prison, this "lifestyle" would be at 
odds with the lifestyle of religious jurors. PCR37-42. But opposition to this 
kind of "lifestyle" is not unique to 1nembers of any particular church, or 
even to religious people at all. Atheists and agnostics would likely have 
similar objections, because crime threatens all law-abiding citizens alike. 
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Obeying the law is a civic virtue, not a religious one, and religion there£ ore 
was not "clearly relevant" to the case. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ,r74.3 
Mulder also claims that religion was relevant to this case because the 
victim, Jordan Allgood, was an LDS bishop. Aplt. Br. 37-38. But contrary to 
Mulder's claim, Allgood' s religious position did not 1nake religion clearly 
relevant to this case. Allgood was not killed while he was at church or 
while he was serving in some ecclesiastical capacity; rather, he was killed 
while he was working at his coin shop. 
Nothing in the record shows that Allgood's status as a bishop was 
ever mentioned to the jury. The only reference in the record to Allgood' s 
status as a bishop came during a pretrial hearing-well before jury selection 
began-in which defense counsel mentioned to the court that Allgood ,,.,was 
a Mormon bishop and well known in the community." R250:5. But in voir 
dire, each prospective juror was asked whether they knew Allgood. No one 
said that they did. 
Despite this, Mulder insists that some juror 1nust have known about 
Allgood's position, speculating that it is "common sense that in a small 
town, people in that town know each other or know of each other" and that 
3 If Mulder's argu1nent on this were accepted, it would theoretically 
make religion relevant to any case involving a criminal, thereby allowing 
this proposed exception to completely swallow the rule. 
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s01ne juror likely knew that Allgood was a bishop. Aplt. Br. 40. But again, 
all of these jurors stated on the record that they did not know Allgood. 
Mulder's claim to the contrary is entirely speculative, and it therefore 
cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance. See Munguia, 2011 UT 5, 
if 30 (proof of prejudice "cannot be a speculative matter but must be a 
demonstrable reality"). 
In short, this record contains no reference to religion in front of the 
Jury. Given this, religion was not clearly relevant to the case and Mulder's 
trial counsel had no basis for asking prospective jurors about it. The district 
court correctly denied this claim. 
B. Appellate counsel had no basis for arguing that there was an 
unconstitutional exclusion of non-Mormons from the jury. 
Mulder also claims that appellate counsel should have argued that his 
h·ial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the alleged exclusion of 
non-Mormons from the jury. Aplt. Br. 14, 40-41. The district court rejected 
this, concluding that because there was "no evidence of any 
unconstitutional exclusion of non-Mormons from the jury," appellate 
counsel had no basis for raising th_is claim. PCR562. 
The district courl was correct. After all, as tv1ulder himself recognizes, 
prospective jurors were not asked about their religious affiliation. This is 
the very basis for the first part of Mulder's claim. But if prospective jurors 
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were not asked about their religion, then trial counsel and the trial court 
would not have known who was (and was not) Mormon. On this record, it 
therefore would not have been obvious to appellate counsel that there was 
any exclusion of non-Mormons from the jury, and appellate counsel 
therefore had no obligation to make what would have been an unsupported 
claim. Kell, 2008 UT 62, ,I42. 
On appeal, Mulder nevertheless argues that he did provide the 
district court with some supporting evidence. He relies on a proffer he 
made that another local attorney sometimes uses a jury questionnaire that 
asks jurors questions about religious affiliation. Aplt. Br. 41. He extrapolates 
that, because the jury questionnaire that was used in his case included no 
religious-affiliation questions, his counsel may have been actively complicit 
in ensuring that non-Monnons were excluded from this jury. Id. 
But this speculation failed as a matter of law to provide a factual basis 
for the claim-that non-Mormons were excluded. And again, because no 
prospective jurors were asked about religious affiliation, there would have 
been no way to prove that prospective jurors were excluded on this basis. 
In any event, even if there had been evidence of such exclusion, 
Mulder has not proven that appellate counsel even could have successfully 
made this claim. Mulder's brief on this aspect of his clahn is somewhat 
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unclear. So far as the State can tell, it appears that Mulder is claiming that 
the alleged exclusion of non-Mormons was done through the use (or non-
use) of peremptory challenges, thereby bringing this under the auspices of 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). But the United States Supreme 
Court has never extended Batson to religion-based strikes, and there II is no 
clear consensus" among the states or federal circuits on whether Batson does 
extend to religion-based strikes. United States v. De]esus, 347 F.3d 500, 509 
n.7 (3d Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Heron, 721 F.3d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 
2013) (recognizing that just one federal circuit and II a handful of state courts 
have extended Batson to strikes based on a juror's religious affiliation"). 
Utah's appellate courts have not yet ruled on this issue. 
But to show ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Mulder must 
point to the "the law in effect at the time of trial." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1228. 
Because there was no conh·olling law extending Batson to religion at the 
time of trial, neither h·ial nor appellate counsel would have a settled basis 
for making this argument. This provides an additional reason why the 
appellate counsel claim fails. 
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V. 
Appellate counsel could reasonably decide not to argue that 
trial counsel was ineffective for passing four jurors for cause. 
Before trial, the parties submitted a stipulated 13-page proposed jury 
questionnaire. Rl0l-114; see also R250:3. Given concerns about the pretrial 
publicity, as well as the victim's standing in the conununity, the trial court 
submitted the questionnaire to prospective jurors and then conducted an 
extensive, two-day voir dire before selecting the jury. R152-54; 261-62. 
In his petition, Mulder claimed that appellate counsel should have 
challenged his trial counsel's decision to pass 11 jurors for cause. PCR51-75. 
The district court rejected each of these arguments, concluding that 
Mulder's "accusations" about the jurors did "not rise above the level of 
'conspiracy theories,' speculation and reckless besmirching of individuals 
and an entire community." PCR562. 
On appeal, Mulder challenges this ruling with respect to four of the 
challenged jurors: Lois Dainack, Kris Gubler, Shawna Holt, and Susan 
Decorsey. Aplt. Br. 29-37. 
A. To prevail, Mulder was required to prove that there was no 
plausible reason for counsel's decision to not move to strike 
each juror, as well as that each juror was actually biased. 
Under rule 18(e)(14), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a juror must 
be stricken where the juror's "conduct, responses, state of mind or other 
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circumstances ... reaso~ably lead the court to conclude the juror is not 
likely to act impartially." 
Courts have interpreted this provision to require striking a juror who 
is actually biased- i.e., who has "strong and deep impressions which will 
close the mind against the testimony that will be offered," thus causing her 
to "combat" any contrary testimony and "resist its force." State v. Ramos, 
882 P.2d 149, 152 (Utah App. 1994) (citation omitted). A juror must 
therefore be stricken when her opinions or biases are "so strong or 
unequivocal as to inevitably taint the trial process." State v. King, 2006 UT 3, 
~23, 131 P.3d 202 (citation omitted). But where the juror only has "light 
impressions" that would not "close the mind against testimony offered in 
opposition," the juror need not be removed for cause. State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 
1217, 1222 (Utah App. 1993); accord State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1127 (Utah 
1989). 
As discussed, in any ineffective assistance clahn, trial counsel's 
performance is only deficient if a defendant identifies specific acts or 
omissions that could not constitute reasonable professional judgment. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 690. When reviewing such a claim, an 
appellate court "indulge[s] a sh·ong presu1nption that counsel's conduct 
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the 
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defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, 
the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy."' Id. at 689 
(citation mnitted). If any "conceivable" tactical basis for trial counsel's 
actions exists, the claim fails. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,I7, 89 P.3d 162. 
In Litherland, the Utah Supreme Court applied this to a claim that was 
based on counsel's failure to object to a particular juror. 2000 UT 76, if20. 
The court recognized two "distinct presumptions" that apply to such cases. 
"First, trial counsel's lack of objection to, or failure to remove, a particular 
juror is presumed to be the product of a conscious choice or preference. 
This follows from the general presumptions imposed by Strickland and from 
the fact that a conscious refusal to object to or remove a particular juror may 
be manifested by nothing more than silence in many circumstances." Id. 
"Second, because the process of jury selection is a highly subjective, 
judgmental, and intuitive process, trial counsel's presumably conscious and 
strategic choke to refrain from removing a particular juror is further 
presumed to constitute effective representation." Id. 
"Consequently, because Strickland requires the presu1nption that trial 
counsel's strategic decisions are reasonable, and because h·ial counsel is 
justified in relying on little more than subjective preference for retaining a 
particular juror, it follows that the decision not to remove a particular juror 
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need only be plausibly justifiable, and such plausible justifiability is 
ordinarily presumed." Id. at ,I25. 
A petitioner may overcome the double presumption only by proving: 
"(1) that defense counsel was so inattentive or indifferent during the jury 
selection process that the failure to remove a prospective juror was not the 
product of conscious choice or preference;" "(2) that a prospective juror 
expressed bias so strong or unequivocal that no plausible countervailing 
subjective preference could justify failure to remove that juror;" or "(3) that 
there is some other specific evidence clearly demonstrating that counsel's 
choice was not plausibly justifiable." Id.; accord Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, 
,I,I74-75, 156 P.3d 739. 
In addition to proving deficient performance, Mulder was also 
required to show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged deficient 
performance. To do show ineffective-assistance based prejudice in the juror 
selection context, a petitioner must show that an actually biased juror sat on 
the jury. See United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316 (2000); State 
v. King, 2008 UT 54, ,I39, 190 P.3d 1283; State v. Arriaga, 2012 UT App 295, 
,I13, 288 P.3d 588. 
As with any other kind of ineffective assistance clain1, a petitioner 
1nust prove both deficient performance and prejudice. Because of this, if it 
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is "easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 
sufficient prejudice," this Court may do so "without analyzing whether 
counsel's performance was professional umeasonable." Archuleta, 2011 UT 
73, if 41 (citation omitted). 
B. Mulder did not carry his burden with respect to Lois Dainack. 
Mulder first challenges trial counsel's decision not to challenge Lois 
Dainack for cause. Aplt. Br. 29-32. Mulder argues that Dainack should 
have been stricken because (1) she had worked as a prison nurse; (2) "she 
had once been the victim of a similar crime"; (3) a statement she made in her 
jury questionnaire suggested that she found police officers to be 1nore 
credible; and (4) "a statement that she made regarding her husband who 
was once a N.Y. police officer" suggested that she was sympathetic to law 
enforcement. Aplt. Br. 29. 
1. Mulder did not prove that Dainack was actually biased. 
As noted, Mulder was required to prove both deficient performance 
and prejudice. Mulder did not prove prejudice because none of the grounds 
he identified demonstrated that Dainack was actually biased. 
Dainack' s past employment as a prison nurse: In her jury 
questionnaire, Lois Dainack stated that she had previously worked as a 
prison nurse. See PCR444. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel initially 
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agreed that she should be stricken for cause on this basis. R262:156. But 
after extensive questioning in chambers, both passed her for cause. 
R262:165-66, 179. 
Contrary to Mulder's claim, her past employment does not show that 
she was actually biased. To the contrary, the Utah Supreme Court and the 
Utah Court of Appeals have both "upheld denials of motions to strike law 
enforcement pers01mel for cause when questioning on voir dire dispels any 
suggestion of bias raised by the prospective juror's law enforcement 
background." Ramos, 882 P.2d at 152; see also Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1127; 
Coggeshell v. State, 2011 UT App 375, ~6, 265 P.3d 818 ("law enforcement 
personnel are not autmnatically disqualified from jury duty in a criminal 
case"). 
In Ramos, for example, the court of appeals concluded that a juror was 
not biased even though the juror had worked as a police dispatcher for 20 
years. 882 P.2d at 152. In Gray, the court of appeals similarly passed a juror 
who had worked as a highway patrolman for four years. 851 P.2d at 1223. 
And in Cobb, the supreme court passed a juror who had worked as a police 
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officer with two different departments over the space of 2 years. 774 P.2d at 
1127.4 
This occurred here. During voir dire, Dainack explained that she had 
worked for 6 years as a prison nurse in the 1naximum security prison in 
New York. R262:157. She then repeatedly stated that this experience would 
not prejudice her in either direction when evaluating this case. R262:159-60. 
Dainack explained: "I think that every person has a right to being heard [on] 
all sides of whatever crime has been committed, and then a judgment made 
from that." R262:160. She further explained that as a medical professional 
in a prison, she had an obligation to treat all prisoners fairly, and that she 
had "tried not to become personal and take - make personal opinions over 
... these inmates that came into our unit." R262:160. 
After Dainack left the court's chambers, defense counsel stated that 
after observing her and hearing her answers on the subject, he believed that 
she had been honest and had "an open mind." R262:165. The trial court 
agreed, stating that Dainack appeared "quite professional" and seern.ed 
"very even handed." R262:166-67. 
4 Mulder nevertheless points to several Colorado decisions that 
apparently require automatic exclusion of prior law enforcement personnel. 
Aplt. Br. 30. But as the above-cited cases demonstrate, this is not the rule in 
Utah. 
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Given this, Dainack' s past service working in a prison- as a nurse, 
not a corrections officer- provided no basis for determining that she was 
actually biased. 
Dainack' s past crime victimization: Mulder raised and argued this 
claim below, but his briefing on appeal is limited to a single sentence. See 
Aplt. Br. 29. In his brief, he provides no record support for the claim, nor 
does he offer any legal analysis of it. It is therefore inadequately briefed and 
should not be considered. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
In any event, if reached, it fails. A "potential juror's prior 
victimization does not mandate the juror be removed for cause." State v. 
Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 553 (Utah App. 1993); accord State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 
461, 469 (Utah App. 1993) ("We are unaware of ... any rule that 
automatically disqualifies prospective jurors who have been, or have friends 
or relatives who have been, victims of crimes similar to those at issue in the 
case where they might sit as jurors."). 
While such an experience might raise an inference of bias, the 
inference can be rebutted. "This is generally accomplished by the trial court 
sirnply asking if the juror can be in1partial." State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 823 
(Utah App. 1994). "If, after probing the prospective juror's state of mind, 
the h·ial court is satisfied that the juror can view and weigh the evidence 
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impartially, the inquiry is at an end." Id. Utah courts have therefore 
repeatedly upheld trial court decisions that a juror who had been victimized 
in similar crime was still impartial. See, e.g., Wach, 2001 UT 35, ,I,I28-31; 
Brooks, 868 P.2d at 823; Boyatt, 854 P.2d at 553; Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 469; 
Here, when Dainack was questioned about this in chambers, she 
explained that she had been burglarized 18-20 years earlier in Nevada. 
R262:161. She said that she felt "a little violated" at the time, but that she 
could evaluate this case fairly despite that experience. R262:161-63. 
Dainack explained that she had not only had time to "get over [it]," but also 
that she had a "brother who went to prison for burglary." R262:163. 
Dainack said: "I love my brother," and accordingly stressed that she would 
have to "know [the] circumstances" before judging someone else who 
allegedly committed such a crime. Id. Thus, regardless of whether her own 
experiences created an inference of bias, Dainack was sufficiently 
rehabilitated. 
Dainack' s statement about police officers: In the written jury 
questioru1aire, jurors were asked: "Do you agree/ disagree with the 
following statement: 'A police officer's testimony in court should receive 
1nore or less weight, be given more or less credibility, than the testimony of 
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a. non-police officer."' PCR444. In response, Dainack wrote: "More 
credible-He holds a position of authority, should be honest." Id. 
Mulder claims that this demonstrated that Dainack was actually 
biased. Aplt. Br. 30-31. But again, the question is whether her alleged bias 
was "so strong or unequivocal as to inevitably taint the trial process," King, 
2006 UT 3, if 23, i.e., whether her opinions would "close the mind against 
testimony offered in opposition." Gray, 851 P.2d at 1222. 
In her written questionnaire, however, Dainack stated that she 
thought she "would be a good juror because [she] would not make a 
decision until" she had "heard all the facts." PCR446. She expressly agreed 
with the statement that because "[o]ne of the basic principles of American 
law is that a person cannot be convicted unless the prosecution proves the 
charges beyond a reasonable doubt," Mulder "is considered not guilty as he 
sits here," and she did not need to "hear anything to find him not guilty." 
PCR447. 
Then, during vou dire, Dainack' s individual questioning and 
counsel's on-the-record discussion about her was extensive-it spanned 23 
pages of h·anscript. See R262:156-79. During that discussion, defense 
counsel heard Dainack state that, because of her experiences working in 
prison, she firmly believed that "every person has a right to being heard all 
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sides of whatever crime has been committed and then a judgment made 
from that." R262:160. Counsel also heard her stress that her brother had 
committed a burglary, that she loved him, and that that influenced her 
perspective on judging someone. R262:163. 
At the conclusion of this discussion, defense counsel remarked on the 
record that he thought she was honest and had II an open 1nind." R262:165. 
The court agreed, stating that she seemed II quite professional" and "very 
even handed." R262:167. 
Given this, Mulder has not demonstrated that this isolated answer 
from the jury questionnaire proved that Dainack was actually biased. 
Dainack's comment about her husband: During questioning, 
Dainack was asked whether her deceased husband had worked for law 
enforcement. R262:171. She explained that he had been a traffic patrol 
officer in New York, but that he had left that job almost thirty years 
previously. R262:172. When defense counsel joked that her husband had 
been a "smoky bear on the turnpike," Dainack responded: "Yeah. One of 
New York's finest." Id. 
Based on this exchange, Mulder argues that appellate counsel should 
have argued that trial counsel should have moved to strike her for cause. 
But contrary to Mulder's assertion, the term "New York's finest" does not 
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appear to have been Dainack' s unqualified value judgment about all law 
enforcement; rather, it is more correctly understood as a reference to the 
common nickname for New York police officers. See, e.g. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/New _ York_ City _Police_Department (last 
visited June 3, 2015) ("Members of the NYPD are frequently referred to by 
politicians, some media, and their own police cars by the nickname New 
York's Finest."). In any event, even if this offhand comment somehow 
created an inference of bias, Dainack was rehabilitated. When the court 
asked Dainack a follow up question about her husband, she stated that 
"there was nothing about being married to him" that would impact her 
thinking about this case. R262:172. This isolated com1nent provides no 
basis for concluding that Dainack was actually biased. 
2. Mulder also has not demonstrated that his counsel had no 
plausible reason for wanting to keep Dainack on this jury. 
As noted, Mulder must also prove deficient performance. In this 
context, he 1nust overcome Litherland's double presumption, which requires 
him to demonstrate, in part, that counsel could not have had any "plausible 
countervailing subjective preference" for retaining her. Litherland, 2000 UT 
76, 7J25. 
Mulder has not done this. As discussed above, Dainack was 
thoroughly vetted during voir dire, during which Dainack reaffirmed her 
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ability to judge fairly and even gave specific reasons for doing so -
including her positive experiences working with inmates, as well her love 
for a brother who had run afoul of the law. See R262:160-63. Defense 
counsel was an active participant in that voir dire and had the opportunity 
to observe Dainack firsthand. Mulder therefore did not show that there was 
no plausible basis for the decision not to challenge her, and the district court 
therefore correctly dismissed this claim on this basis as well. 5 
C. Mulder did not carry his burden with respect to Kris Gubler. 
Defense counsel passed Kris Gubler for cause and Gubler ultimately 
sat on the jury. R261:162. Mulder now claims that appellate counsel should 
have argued that trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to strike 
Gubler because: (1) Gubler was an LDS bishop, (2) Gubler was once a 
military police officer, and also had relatives who are officers. Aplt. Br. 33-
5 In passing, Mulder also claims that under Litherland's second prong, 
his counsel was "so inattentive or indifferent during the jury selection 
process" regarding Dainack II that the failure to remove a prospective juror 
was not the product of conscious choice or preference." Aplt. Br. 31-32; see 
also Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ~25. But such a claiin is "defeat[ ed]" where the 
transcript shows that trial counsel questioned prospective jurors during voir 
dire. Taylor, 2007 UT 12, ,I84. Here, Mulder's trial counsel was actively 
engaged throughout the voir dire process. Mulder's attorneys propounded 
a 12-page jury questionnaire to all prospective jurors in advance of trial, and 
both of his attorneys actively participated in the questioning of the 
prospective individual jurors throughout the two days of voir dire. See 
R261-62. This included the discussion about Dainack. See R262:156-79. 
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35. Mulder also claimed that he is entitled to relief because the transcript of 
Gubler' s individual voir dire is incomplete. Id. 
1. Mulder did not prove that Gubler was actually biased. 
Gubler's status as a bishop: As noted above, religion was not an 
issue in this case, and nothing in this record demonsh·ates that it actually 
impacted Gubler' s ability to fairly evaluate Mulder's guilt or innocence. 
Mulder has not shown otherwise. Instead, he 1nerely speculates that 
Gubler might have known Allgood because both were LDS bishops. But he 
points to nothing in the record which supports this. There was accordingly 
no evidentiary basis to establish that Gubler was actually biased against 
Mulder because of his ecclesiastical position. See Munguia, 2011 UT 5, if30 
(proof of prejudice "cannot be a speculative matter but must be a 
demonstrable reality"). 
Gubler's connections to law enforcement: Mulder also claims that 
Gubler was actually biased because of his prior service as a military police 
officer, and also because Gubler had family 1nembers who are police 
officers. Aplt. Br. 33-35. 
The record does not support this claim. with respect to Gubler' s own 
alleged service. In his questionnaire, Gubler specifically stated that he had 
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not served in the military, and he separately noted that he had never been 
"in the military police." PCR426-27. 
Nor do the alleged family connections establish actual bias. As noted 
above, a potential juror's own service as a police officer does not 
automatically disqualify him from jury service. See Ramos, 882 P.2d at 152; 
Gray, 851 P.2d at 1223. This principle also applies when the prospective 
juror has family members who are police officers. See, e.g., Wach, 2001 UT 
35, if41 (rejecting a bias claim that was based on one of the jurors being 
related to a police officer). 
Transcript: Finally, Mulder attempts to overcome the lack of record 
support for his actual bias claim against Gubler by claiming that his 
conviction should have been set aside under State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 
(Utah 1983). Aplt. Br. 33-35. Mulder's argmnent fails for two reasons. 
First, Taylor involved a situation like this one in which the transcript 
from voir dire was incomplete in the appellate record. But that case is 
inapposite because the claim at issue in Taylor was a preserved claim that 
was raised on direct appeal. Here, however, Mulder's claim arises in the 
context of a post-conviction challenge to his appellate counsel's 
performance. Thus, unlike Taylor, Mulder cannot prevail by simply 
showing that there was some error; rather, Mulder must overcome a strong 
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presumption that his counsel performed competently. And in the particular 
context of a failure to move to strike a particular juror, silence alone is not 
enough. Instead, "a conscious refusal to object to or remove a particular 
juror may be manifested by nothing more than silence in many 
circumstances." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, -J20. Taylor therefore does not 
support Mulder's request for reversal based on nothing more than an 
incomplete transcription. 
Second, even on its own terms, Taylor does not support Mulder's 
claim. The conviction in Taylor was set aside because of the broad scope of 
the transcription error-specifically, the voir dire record in that case was so 
inadequate that the juror's answers were "totally absent from the record." 
Taylor, 664 P.2d at 447. That is not the case here, where the record contains 
Gubler' s questimmaire, portions of Gubler' s voir dire, and most 
significantly, the conclusion of both defense counsel and the court that 
Gubler was not biased. See R261:162 (defense counsel and the court passing 
Gubler for cause). 
Moreover, Taylor did not require the conviction to be set aside 
because of the h·anscription error alone. Rather, Taylor required reversal 
because the transcription error in question involved prospective jurors 
whose impartiality was already in question, and because there was a 
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cognizable claim that the trial court had not permitted further questioning 
to explore the bias- thereby rebutting the inference that counsel had 
strategically chosen to pass the jurors for cause. See Taylor, 664 P.2d at 445-
47. Subsequent Utah decisions have recognized this, refusing to set aside 
convictions based on an incomplete voir dire h 4 anscript if the record also 
showed that counsel chose to pass the jurors in question. See State v. 
Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ,I,I34-36, 28 P.3d 1278; State v. Russell, 917 P.2d 557, 
559-60 (Utah App. 1996). Here, Mulder has not shown that Gubler' s 
impartiality was ever in question, nor has he shown that the trial court ever 
prevented his counsel from asking Gubler any questions to explore the 
alleged bias. Taylor therefore does not require reversal. 
2. Mulder also has not demonstrated that his counsel had no 
plausible reason for wanting to keep Gubler on this jury. 
Again, even if defense counsel could have moved to strike Gubler for 
cause, this does not mean that counsel was required to. Instead, Mulder 
must show that Gubler "expressed bias so strong or unequivocal that no 
plausible countervailing subjective preference could justify failure to 
remove that juror." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,i2s. 
Although the transcript of Gubler' s vou dire is admittedly 
incomplete, his questionnaire gives ample reason why counsel could have 
thought that Gubler would be a good juror. When Gubler was asked 
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whether it was more important to him "that the innocent be acquitted or 
that the guilty be convicted," Gubler stated that it was more important to 
him that the "innocent be acquitted." PCR433. Gubler stated that he 
understood the presumption of innocence and was comfortable with the 
idea that he did not need to "hear anything to find [Mulder] not guilty." Id. 
Gubler also expressed a willingness to "completely set aside" any prior 
opinions about the case and "render [his] decision only based on the 
evidence presented during the trial." PCR434. 
Moreover, in his questionnaire, Gubler also acknowledged that he 
had visited the jail before, explaining that he did so ..,in the capacity of a 
LDS Bishop." PCR430. In this sense, counsel could have readily believed 
that Gubler's service as a bishop would actually make him a sympathetic 
juror, given that he had personal experience ministering to parishioners 
who had been incarcerated. 
Because of this, Mulder has not demonstrated that there was no 
plausible basis for the decision not to challenge Gubler, and the district 
court therefore correctly denied this claim on this basis as well. 
D. Mulder did not carry his burden with respect to Shawna Holt. 
Defense counsel passed Shawna Holt for cause and she sat on the 
jury. R261:162; 262:276. Mulder argues that appellate counsel should have 
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argued that trial counsel was ineffective for not striking her because she 
said that she was friends with the wife of Judge James Shumate. Aplt. Br. 
36. 
First, Mulder has not shown actual bias. Judge Shumate did not 
preside over this case; Judge Rand Beacham did. Mulder points to no case 
that holds that a juror cannot sit if she is friends with the spouse of a judge 
who is not presiding over this case, nor does he explain how this would 
have created actual bias this case. See id. Moreover, Holt was rehabilitated 
about this potential issue. During voir dire, she was asked whether she had 
"ever discussed the law in any way with Judge Shumate." She responded: 
"Never." R262:272. 
Second, Mulder points to nothing else in this record demonstrating 
that Holt was prejudiced against him. He therefore cannot show that her 
limited connection to the wife of a non-involved judge created a bias that 
was "so strong or unequivocal that no plausible countervailing subjective 
preference could justify failure to remove that juror." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 
il25. 
E. Mulder did not carry his burden with respect to Susan 
Decorsey. 
Finally, Mulder argues that appellate counsel should have argued 
that trial counsel should have moved to sh·ike Susan Decorsey because "she 
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tried to secure employment with the police force and has a close friend with 
the L.A.P.D." Aplt. Br. 36. Mulder cites no record support for his claim that 
Decorsey did this, nor does he provide legal analysis about why these facts 
(if true) would make Decorsey biased. This claim is thus inadequately 
briefed and should be disregarded. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
In any event, as discussed, Utah precedent allows law enforcement 
officers or their families to serve on juries. Mulder points to no authority, 
and the State is aware of none, stating that people who have applied for law 
enforcement positions or have friends who are in law enforcement cannot 
serve. Because of this, he has not shown that she was actually biased, let 
alone that trial counsel could have had no plausible countervailing reason 
for wanting to keep her on this jury. 
VI. 
Appellate counsel could reasonably decide not to argue that 
trial counsel was ineffective for not subpoenaing additional 
alibi witnesses. 
In his petition, Mulder argued that appellate counsel was ineffective 
for failing to argue that h·ial counsel should have subpoenaed additional 
alibi wih1esses. See PCR112-15. Mulder relied on two letters-one from his 
1nother, Pa h·icia Diepen, and one from her brother, Michael Smith-
allegedly written to his appellate counsel detailing their efforts to 
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corroborate Mulder's claim that he was in Mesquite, rather than St. George, 
at the time of the Allgood robbery and murder. 6 
The district court ruled that these letters were "insufficient to 
establish a valid alibi because they do not show that [Mulder] could not 
have been at the crime scene on the day and at the time of the murder .... 
Therefore, it was not ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail to 
raise this issue on appeal." PCR568. The dish·ict court was correct. 
First, appellate counsel could reasonably have chosen to omit this 
claim because neither letter shows that Mulder's mother or uncle had 
actually identifie<:I a viable alibi witness. In her letter, Diepen said that she 
spoke with 11 the people at Uncle Buck's and the Southwest Spirit" about 
Mulder's alleged whereabouts at the time of the robbery and murder, but 
she does not identify who any of these people are, let alone demonstrate 
that they could have been subpoenaed at the time of Mulder's trial. 
Addendum C. In his letter, Smith was even 1nore vague, stating only that 
he had spoken with "potential witnesses" - but he provided no names, 
6 As with the Campbell affidavit discussed above, these were 
provided as attachments to the post-conviction petition but not included in 
the appellate record. Mulder has provided them as attachments to his brief, 
and the State does so as well as Addendmn C. See also Aplt. Br., 
Attachments J & K. 
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contact information, or identifying information for any potential witness. 
Id. 
In addition to not identifying the missing witnesses, the letters don't 
actually establish an alibi. An alibi is a "defense based on the physical 
impossibility of a defendant's guilt by placing the defendant in a location 
other than the scene of the crime at the relevant time." Black's Law 
Dictionary, Alibi (9th ed. 2009). A "purported alibi which leaves it possible 
for the accused to be the guilty person is no alibi at all." State v. Romero, 554 
P.2d 216,219 (Utah 1976). 
In this case, Mulder's claim was that he never left Mesquite with 
Campbell on the morning of the murder, but that he instead stayed behind 
in Mesquite and tried selling jewelry to local merchants. See R255:590-93. 
The two letters that Mulder relies on provide no ad1nissible proof of this. 
At most, both contain secondhand accounts of what others may have said, 
and therefore would have been inad1nissible hearsay. Moreover, both 
lacked specific detail that could have proven Mulder's claim. In her letter, 
Diep en claimed that she visited two stores in Mesquite, showed pictures of 
Mulder to "the people at both places," and talked to people who 
"reme1nbered [Mulder] being there and what they talked about." 
Addendum C. But Diepen said nothing about locating any proof that 
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anyone remembered seeing Mulder in their stores on the morning of 
N ove1nber 25, 2003, which would be necessary to support an actual alibi. 
See id. 
Smith's letter was similarly unhelpful. There, he said that when he 
and Diepen visited the stores in Mesquite, "[w]hat we found was hopeful 
but inconclusive due to the lack of physical proof that too much lapsed time 
brings." Addendum C. Smith said that people remembered seeing Mulder 
"in their places of business," but he never claimed that anyone specifically 
remembered seeing Mulder in their business on the morning of November 
25, 2003. Id. 
These letters therefore did not create a viable alibi, because, even if 
they were true, it was still possible that Mulder visited the stores on some 
other day or time, rather than on the exact day and time in which Campbell 
robbed and shot Jordan Allgood. Thus, because it is still "possible for the 
accused to be the guilty person," these affidavits created "no alibi at all." 
Romero, 554 P.2d at 219. 
In short, because Mulder does not point to any testilnony frmn any 
identified wih1ess that could have proven that he could not have been in St. 
George at the tilne of the n1urder, he has not shown that his appellate 
counsel overlooked a claim that likely would have resulted in reversal. 
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VII. 
Appellate counsel could reasonably decide not to argue that 
the trial court should have appointed substitute counsel. 
Finally, Mulder argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for not 
arguing that the trial court should have appointed substitute counsel 
because Mulder's counsel prevented him from "present[ing] his theory of 
the case." Aplt. Br. 46. The district court rejected this, ruling that Mulder's 
"trial counsel did present [Mulder's] theory of the case at the trial, through 
[Mulder's] own testimony." PCR566. The district court was correct. 
"While an indigent defendant has a right to have counsel appointed 
to represent him, he does not have a constitutional right to a lawyer other 
than the one appointed, absent good cause." State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 
272 (Utah App. 1987). When "a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with 
counsel, a trial court must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to 
determine the nature of the defendant's complaints." State v. Lovell, 1999 
UT 40, 127, 984 P.2d 382; see also Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 272. 
Here, Mulder complained about his counsel to the trial court on two 
occasions. R. 82; R255:520. But despite this, the court never replaced 
counsel, nor is there any indication that it conducted a Purs~fell inquiry. 
Failure to conduct such an investigation is per se error. See State v. 
Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 962-63 (Utah App. 1998). But a defendant is not 
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entitled to reversal if the record is "sufficient to support the trial court's 
determination that good cause did not exist for substitute counsel." State v. 
Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, ,Il4, 27 P.3d 573; accord In re C.C., 2002 UT App 
149, ,I13, 48 P.3d 244. 
This was the case here. Mulder's dissatisfaction with his trial counsel 
stemmed from their alleged unwillingness to present his preferred theory of 
the case. See Aplt. Br. 45-49. Mulder's theory of the case was detailed in a 
February 24, 2006, letter that he wrote to his counsel, which he attached to 
his post-conviction petition. See PCR386. In that letter, Mulder alleged: that 
the coin robbery was Schlegel' s idea, not his; that Schelegel tried 
blackmailing him into robbing the store; that Mulder apparently agreed to 
rob the store, but then secretly planned to stay in Mesquite and not 
participate in the robbery; and that Campbell drove to St. George on his 
own and robbed the store. See id. 
This is exactly the story that Mulder presented at trial over a year 
later. Mulder testified, and his counsel elicited this precise account during 
his direct examination. See R255:556-608. Counsel also had an investigator 
attempt to verify Mulder's claim that he stayed behind in Mesquite, and 
that investigator testified that he was able to corroborate Mulder's 
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descriptions of the stores he allegedly visited and the people Mulder 
allegedly spoke to. See generally R255:653-61. 
Thus, whatever the extent of Mulder's conflict with counsel, that issue 
did not end up mattering because Mulder's counsel later facilitated a direct 
examination in which Mulder told the very story that he now claims he 
wanted to present. Mulder therefore was not prejudiced by appellate 
counsel's omission of this claim, and the district court correctly denied it. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on June 8, 2015. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for A ppellee 
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Addendum A 
Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-104 (West 2009) Grounds for relief - Retroactiv-
ity of rule 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78B-9-106 or 78B-9-107, a person who has been 
convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district 
court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the 
conviction or sentence upon the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed under a statute that 
is in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the con-
duct for which the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed or probation was revoked in violation of the con-
trolling statutory provisions; 
( d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United 
States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the 
conviction or sentence, because: 
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the 
time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously 
filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could 
not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not 1nerely cumulative of evidence that was known; 
(iii) the n1aterial evidence is not 1nerely impeachment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence 
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner 
guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received; or 
(f) the petitioner can prove entitlement to relief under a rule announced by the 
United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supre1ne Court, or the Utah Court of 
Appeals after conviction and sentence beca1ne final on direct appeal, and that: 
(i) the rule was dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's con-
viction or sentence became final; or 
(ii) the rule decrhninalizes the conduct that comprises the elements of the crime 
for which the petitioner was convicted. 
(2) The court 111ay not grant relief fron1 a conviction or sentence unless the peti-
tioner establishes that there would be a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outco1ne in light of the facts proved in the post-conviction proceeding, viewed 
with the evidence and facts inh·oduced at trial or during sentencing. 
(3) The court may not grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the pe-
titioner is innocent of the crime for which convicted except as provided in Title 
78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or Part 4, Post-Conviction 
Determination of Factual Innocence. 
Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-106 (West 2009) Preclusion of relief-Exception 
(Formerly cited as UT ST§ 78-35a-106) 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-h·ial 1notion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief 
or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-
conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107. 
(2) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time, 
including during the state's appeal from an order granting post-conviction relief, 
unless the court determines that the state should have raised the time bar or 
procedural bar at an earlier time. Any court may raise a procedural bar or time 
bar on its own motion, provided that it gives the parties notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a 
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if 
the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
.r, 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRJCT COUR~y'; ~\ rr. =:· ,, II;¾.~ 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE W, W,~. P/1 5. 13 ""' ·•'tt, 
~ ·• t: U1-JTi· ~ \'j', 
TODDWAYNEMULDER, RULING1smfRESP0NJ;>ENI'SMOTION ~() 
--.;;,..;._ 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Respondent. 
Civil 'No. 100502932 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came before the Court on Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment as to 
Petitioner's two remaining grounds for post-conviction relief: Ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel (which also incorporates Petitioner's previous claims) and newly discovered evidence. 
Respondent's supporting memorandum consists of more than l 00 pages of print plus 
attachments, and Petitioner's opposing memorandum consists of 49 pages of single-spaced 
handwriting plus attachments. The Court heard oral arguments on the motion and took the matter 
under advisement. 
The Court notes that summary judgment is an awkward context for a case filed under the Post 
Convictions Remedies Act. Ordinarily, the facts and inferences therefrom which are considered in 
~ relation to a summary judgment motion are viewed and construed in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment. In this type of case, however, all factual issues must be resolved 
"in favor of the jury's verdict and the rulings of the trial court." State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, 
il 1 n. 1. Accordingly, the Court applies the standard for a case filed under the Post Convictions 
Remedies Act. 
Having fully considered the matter, the Court grants the Motion. The Court is persuaded 
almost entirely by Respondent's arguments, and will not indulge in much analysis of those issues 
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which are well-presented in the parties' memoranda. Due to caseload and time restraints, the Court 
provides only the following summary of the issues and the Court's rulings: 
1. Trial counsel's failure to challenge potential jurors 
on the basis of religious beliefs or preferences was not 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
There are three reasons that Petitioner's claims fail. First, trial strategy is discretionary, and 
failure to make religion an issue is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, the Utah 
Constitution prohibits finding a juror incompetent "on account of religious belief or the absence 
thereof." Inquiry into religious belief is permissible only where religion is "clearly relevant" to the 
case. It was not in Petitioner's case. Third, there is no evidence of any unconstitutional exclusion 
of non-Mormons from the jury. Petitioner relies on speculation, innuendo and falsehoods of which 
the Court could take judicial notice. Therefore, it was not ineffective assistance for appellate counsel 
to fail to raise these issues on appeal. 
2. Trial counsel's failure to challenge individual 
jurors for cause was not ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel. 
Challenges for cause must be granted only if a prospective juror is so strongly and 
unequivocally biased "as to inevitably taint the trial process." The comis presume that failure to 
object to a juror is a conscious choice by trial counsel and that it is effective representation, unless 
the Petitioner shows that trial counsel was "so inattentive or indifferent" duringjury selection, or that 
the juror was so biased, or that specific evidence shows counsel's choice was not plausibly 
justifiable, that the presumption is overcome. Such evidence has not been presented. Petitioner's 
accusations do not rise above the level of "conspiracy theories," speculation and reckless 
besmirching of individuals and an entire community. 
The record shows that trial counsel actively questioned prospective jurors during voir dire, 
2 0562 
and that Petitioner only speculates, without evidence, that trial counsel "purposely" selected a jury 
~ of members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. There is no evidence before the 
Court to establish such speculation as fact. Petitioner fails to show that any juror was actually and 
impermissibly biased. The record shows that voir dire questioning established that there was no such 
bias. 
Therefore, it was not ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise these issues 
on appeal. 
3. Trial counsel's failure to argue for 12 peremptory 
challenges was not ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel. 
This was not a capital case, so Petitioner was not entitled to ten peremptory challenges. Rule 
18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure gave Petitioner the right to four challenges, plus those 
i,;j) related to alternate jurors. There is no legal basis for Petitioner's argument that he was entitled to 
additional peremptory challenges because there were multiple charges. Therefore, it was not 
ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise this issue on appeal. 
4. Petitioner's claim based on newly discovered 
evidence does not show that no reasonable trier of fact 
could find him guilty if such evidence, with all other 
evidence. were presented at a new trial. 
Respondent's supporting memorandum made arguments on the assumption that Petitioner 
was claiming that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that trial counsel was 
ineffective because of trial counsel's failure to request a new trial on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence. Tn those arguments, Respondent established three reasons that Petitioner could not make 
such a claim. 
Petitioner's opposing memorandum, however, clarified that his newly discovered evidence 
claim was not related to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Accordingly, the arguments are 
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considered under the standard of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9- l 04(1 )( e ), which has four parts that 
Petitioner must satisfy. 
Petitioner also clarified that he offers the two affidavits of Daniel Campbell's fellow inmates 
only to show how Petitioner became aware of Daniel Campbell's recantation of his trial testimony. 
Petitioner does not suggest that these two affidavits are offered for the truth or falsity of Daniel 
Campbell's statements to the affiants. Accordingly, the two affidavits are relevant only to the timing 
of Petitioner's discovery of the newly discovered evidence in relation to §104(l)(e)(i), and appear 
to show that Petitioner has met this requirment. The timing of Petitioner' discovery would not be 
relevant to trial evidence if Petitioner's case were retried, however, so these two affidavits are not 
considered in relation to whether Petitioner has met the requirements of§ I 04( 1 )( e )(ii) through (iv). 1 
Neither party has discussed adequately whether Petitioner has shov\rn that his newly 
discovered evidence "is not merely cumulative of evidence that was lmown." For reasons stated 
below, however, it is not necessary for the Court to rule as to § I 04(1 )( e )(ii). 
With respect to whether the newly discovered evidence "is not merely impeaclnnent 
evidence," the issue is whether Daniel Campbell's recantation and expected new testimony at a new 
trial would actually constitute impeachment evidence. That might depend on whether the 
prosecution in a new trial would be allowed to introduce Daniel Can1pbell' s original trial testimony 
before either pa11y called him for his new testimony. Regardless of when Daniel Campbell would 
be called to testify at a new trial, whatever he testified there would be subject to impeaclunent with 
his contradictory testimony-even ifhe there recanted his recantation. Neither pa1ty has discussed 
this point adequately, however, and the Comt's ruling is not based on §104(1)(e)(iii). 
1In addition, Petitioner occasionally offers his own statements regarding his intentions at 
the time of the crime. E.g., see Petitioner's memorandum pp. 22 and 27. Such statements are not 
newly discovered evidence and are not considered for any purpose. 
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Ultimately, Petitioner's newly discovered evidence claims fails because he has not shown 
ViJ that "viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence demonstrates that 
no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense." Utah Code Ann. 
§104(1)(e)(iv).2 The purported new evidence of Daniel Campbell, who already testified against 
Petitioner at the trial, would be contradictory both to the former trial testimony of Daniel Campbell 
and Petitioner himself. Furthermore, this new evidence of Daniel Campbell would have little 
Gt> credibility because Daniel Campbell would clearly be admitting that he lied under oath at Petitioner's 
first trial. Finally, the prosecution would still have the testimony of Lori Schlegel and the physical 
evidence against Petitioner. 
Consequently, when the Court considers the substance of this newly discovered evidence and 
its probable weight at a new trial, the newly discovered evidence, viewed with all the other evidence, 
~ certainly does not demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact would find Petitioner guilty. 
5. Trial counsel's failure to request a jury instruction 
as to accomplice credibility was not ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel. 
Petitioner is incorrect as a matter of law in his suggestion that his conviction could not be 
based on the testimonies of his accomplices without corroboration. 
Furthermore, the accomplice testimony at Petitioner's trial came from two accomplices, 
Daniel Campbell and Lori Schlegel, and the testimony of each accomplice corroborated that of the 
other. In that circumstance, the trial court was not required to give a cautionary instruction and it 
2The phrasing of this statute suggests that the Court should imagine that the newly 
discovered evidence had been given at the first trial, not that the Court should imagine what 
effect the newly discovered evidence might have in a new trial. This would result in an odd 
@ analysis, however, in which Daniel Campbell would have given his former trial testimony and 
then have given his expected new testimony in the first trial. Rather than participate in such an 
odd analysis, the Court will phrase this po11ion of its ruling in terms of the effect the newly 
discovered evidence might have in a new trial. 
5 
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was not ineffective assistance for trial counsel not to request such an instruction. 
In addition, while Petitioner quibbles about the testimony given by Lori Schlegel and Daniel 
Campbell, Petitioner has not shown that the testimonies of his accomplices were so self-
contradictory, uncertain, or improbable as to require the Court to give a cautionary instruction, or 
that the Court should have given one, so it was not ineffective assistance for trial counsel not to 
request such an instruction. 
Finally, Petitioner has not shown that an additional jury instruction as to accomplice 
credibility would likely have resulted in a different verdict, because (a) the trial court did instruct the 
jury as to the credibility of witnesses generally and (b) the questioning of Petitioner's accomplices 
by his trial counsel fully identified for the jury the issues as to the credibility, motives, and potential 
biases of those accomplices. 
Therefore, it was not ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise these issues 
on appeal. 
6. Trial counsel's failure to request the appointment 
of substitute counsel was not ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel. 
The reasons given by Petitioner for the appointment of substitute counsel did not and do not 
constitute good cause for such an appointment. Petitioner's trial counsel did present Petitioner's 
theory of the case at the trial, through Petitioner's own testimony. Petitioner's trial counsel also 
presented the only alibi evidence that might have been obtained from the defense investigator. 
Petitioner's trial counsel further presented the testimony of Joel Daugherty, a fellow inmate of Daniel 
Campbell, in an effort to impeach Daniel Campbell's testimony. Nothing suggested by Petitioner 
in this respect shows any likelihood of a different verdict. Therefore, it was not ineffective 
assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise this issue on appeal. 
6 
.~fil ~. 05 66 
© 
© 
@ 
@ 
7. Trial counsel's stipulation to certain facts 
regarding Daniel Campbell's crimes was not 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
The written stipulation presented to the jury was clearly the result of a well-considered, 
strategic decision by trial counsel, intended to avoid alarming the jury with the violent details of 
Daniel Campbell's crimes and thereby inflame the jury about Petitioner's case. Nothing in the 
written stipulation contradicted Petitioner's own trial testimony. Therefore, it was not ineffective 
@ assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise this issue on appeal. 
8. Appellate counsel's failure to argue that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Daniel 
Campbell adequately was not ineffective assistance of 
~ appellate counsel because such an argument would 
have been factually incorrect and ultimately futile. 
First, the nature and relevant terms of Daniel Campbell's plea agreement, to a first degree 
vi, felony murder charge, were correctly and sufficiently presented to the jury. Testimony was given 
by Daniel Campbell, Joel Daugherty, and another expert witness regarding "prison culture" and what 
the jury might think of the testimony of a prison inmate such as Campbell 
Second, trial counsel did question Joel Daugherty at trial about his purported conversation 
with Daniel Campbell regarding Campbell's purported conversation with an unidentified prosecutor. 
~ Petitioner fails to show that anything else could reasonably have been done with this evidence or that 
it would likely have produced a different result. 
Third, evidence of the purported promise of prosecutors to write a letter to the Board of 
Pardons regarding Daniel Campbell's cooperation with the prosecution of Petitioner does not appear 
in the appellate record, so it would not have been obvious to appellate counsel. 
Finally, Campbell was impeached at length by trial counsel and Petitioner has failed to show 
a reasonable probability that his verdict would have been different if the purpo1ied promise had been 
7 
presented to the jury. 
Therefore, it was not ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise these issues 
on appeal. 
9. A1mellate counsel's failure to argue that there was 
prosecutorial misconduct was not ineffective 
assistance. 
This claim received ample discussion in the parties' memoranda. Simply put, Petitioner's 
claims of prosecutorial misconduct are not shown to be factually or legally correct. Therefore, it was 
not ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise this issue on appeal. 
10. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
subpoena Petitioner's mother, uncle and other 
unidentified persons as alibi witnesses. 
The affidavits of the two proposed alibi witnesses are insufficient to establish a valid alibi, 
because they do not show that Petitioner could not have been at the crime scene on the day and at 
the time of the murder. The private investigator, whom Petitioner's trial counsel called as a witness 
regarding Petitioner's alibi theory, admitted he found no evidence to support a valid alibi. 
Petitioner's reference to unidentified persons who were not subpoenaed for alibi testimony fails to 
meet his burden of producing facts to supp011 his claim for relief. Therefore, it was not ineffective 
assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise this issue on appeal. 
11. Appellate counsel's argument regarding a merger 
of the aggravated kidnaping charge into the 
aggravated robbery charge was not ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel. 
Here Petitioner challenges what appellate counsel did do, rather that what appellate counsel 
did not do. This claim also fails because, if the merger argument had prevailed, it may have 
significantly reduced Petitioner's sentence, notwithstanding Petitioner's speculation to the contrary. 
Therefore, it was not ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to raise this issue on appeal. 
8 ,~~ -- 05 68 
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CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Respondent's 
counsel may submit an appropriate order and judgment. 
~\--
Dated this-·~- day of October, 2012. 
-{/~ ':) t·· I •: ,. ,-_.,, --.. -~ ... 
• ~\ .· c;( ~C.~- --~-k---------
JUDGE G. RAND BEACHAM 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this i•V day of Qtt__, 2012, I provided true and correct copies 
of the foregoing RULINGS to each of the attorneys/parties named below by placing a copy in the 
United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Todd Wayne Mulder 
Inmate No. 178178 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Ryan D. Tenney 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 ~~ 
DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT 
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AddendumC 
AddendumC 
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MARGARET PRIM LINDSAY (6766) 
P.O. Box 1058 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Telephone: (801) 318-3194 
TODD WAYNE MULDER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DANIEL CAMPBELL 
I, DANIEL CA.lv.[PBELL, being first duly sworn according to law, onmy oath 
depose and say: 
1. I am an inmate of the Utah Department of Corrections, # 169017. I am 
incarcerated for the robbery and death of Jordan Allgood. Todd Mulder was also 
charged. 
2. At Mulder's trial, I testified against him. I lied. Subsequently, I prepared a 
handwritten, notarized affidavit explaining what had really happened and that I lied about 
Mulder's involvement. This affidavit was prepared solely at my discretion. Nobody 
asked me to write it. I did it freely and voluntarily. I have not been threatened or coerced 
into making these statements. I have not seen Mulder since his trial, or spoken to him 
since before our arrests. 
3. Mulder was wrongfully convicted of the charges sun-ounding the robbery and 
death of Allgood. He was not present when I entered the store, did the robbery, shot-
Ajlgood, and left him han_dcuffed. While I had some discussion aboi.it robbin9,,, the 
Allgood store with Mulder, he did not plan the robbery with me. His involvement was 
even less than Lori Schlegel's. 
4. In addition, he did not drive me to St. George, Utah. I b~rrowed Schlegel' s 
truck from Mulder and left him at a shopping complex in Mesquite, Nevada, so he could 
~ r / 
sell some items; P.v D S: P IZ.1, v I!. l r TT) ~ ..... -b rib(!.& t v-l 1),-""'--r Hrs 14, 0 .,, ....rp o e: / ~ 
. . ~#f/ 5. I understand that I could possibly be prosecuted for pe!]ury. However, what is 
written in my handwritten affidavit and this one is the truth: I, alone, committed the 
robbery and kidnapping of Jordan Allgood, and caused his death. I did not mention the 
shooting of Allgood to Mulder or Schlegel when I returned to Mesquite. Schlegel and 
Mulder did take possession a portion of the money and coins from the robbery, but that is 
all. 
DATED this / f/ day of December, 2010. 
dL-~ll-?ANIEL CAM"PBELL / 
SlJBSCRIBED .A-1'ID SWORN TO before me this / 7 day of December, 2010. 
ROSE MARiE VAN DYKE 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF UTAH 
My Commission Expires on: 
February 23. 2014 
Commission # 581628 
~:-, 
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October 31, 2009 
Atty: Margaret Lindsay 
P.O. Box 1058 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Re: Todd W. Mulder#41299 
Case #052501050 
Dear Margaret, 
Enclosed, please find a couple of pictures that I took with me to Utah when I 
spoke with Modrae at Southwest Spirit and Jarred Noel of Uncle Buck's, the 
two of the three places that my brother and I went to, to confirm that Todd was 
in fact with these people. There was one other jewelry store that we went to, 
but the owner wasn't there at that time. However, the people at both places 
remembered Todd being there and what they talked about. Like I said on 
the phone with you the other day, I am sure that Todd's attorney's were get-
ting nervous with me being there, and what I might find out. In my estimation, 
Todd's attorney's were working for the prosecution instead of Todd. 
Also, enclosed is a copy of the letter, written and signed by Derek Clay # 
40912 on the 24th of October, 2007, an inmate at Gunnison, stating that 
Todd in fact had nothing to do with the robbery and murder of Mr. Jordan 
Allgood in November of 2003. 
On behalf of my son, Todd W. Mulder, I have to state with I do not believe 
that Todd would ever hurt anyone. Yes, he has been in trouble before, as 
you know, but, I cannot and will not believe that Todd is quilty in this case. 
I think he was completely railroaded. 
I sincerely hope that the enclosed will help you to understand Todd, and 
believe him, as I do. If there is anything else I can do, just let me know, 
and I'll do anything and everything I can to help prove his innocence. 
Thank you so very much for taking the time to talk to me on the phone the 
other day, it sure made me feel a little better about the situation, knowing 
that someone like you is in charge. 
Sincerely, 
Patricia A. Diepen 
150 Cortona Way #250 
Brentwood, Ca. 94513 
Phone: 925-513-4061 
Please feel free to call me collect at anytime. 
March 13, 2009 
Trip to see Todd Mulder: 
My sister Pat Diepen asked me to drive here to visit her son Todd in Utah. With 
his location, she is not physically able to see him herself. 
As Pat and I drove to Utah she told me the entire story of the events that 
lead to Todd's incarceration. As the story unfolded, it became obvious the 
official record on this case is not what happened. Regardless of the out 
come of this hearing or the lack of evidence at this late date the delay has 
worked a 100 fold against Todd's innocence in this crime. 
I have known Todd since he was a baby and watched him grow up into a young 
man, which unfortunately he got mixed up with the wrong kids. He's no Angel, 
but he is also no killer. If you spend 10 minutes with Todd on any subject he is 
alert, engaged and caring of the topic and discussion. He is intelligent, sincere 
and any physiologist worth their salt can see he is not capable or better, to 
intelligent for murder. 
After Pat's visit with Todd, I suggested as a whim, more than anything, that 
we visit the potential witnesses that could prove Todd's innocence. What we 
found was hopeful but inconclusive due to the lack of physical proof that too 
much lapsed time brings, remembered conversations, physical evidence (items 
for sale or viewed), surveillance camera tapes etc. all that will prove he was at 
these places. 
Even after this totally negligent amount of valuable wasted time, individuals still 
remembered him in their places of business. The only issue that was more 
amazing to us is that no one recalls any investigation by anyone during the time 
of the crimel Which, of course, proves Todd's innocence immediately. 
I have not met, nor do I wish to meet the original investigators on this case, but 
the disgrace they represent to the U.S. Criminal Justice System and shear 
devastation dealt to my Sister and her Son is -CRIMINAL. If I ran my business 
like they ran this investigation I would be out of business. Unfortunately, in this 
case, an innocent man sits in prison for something he couldn't have done. 
Has anyone looked closely at the individual's who where responsible for this 
murder and honestly admit the character these people possess warrant's 
credible judgment against any human being? 
Someone, please apply true justice to this case so this man can go home. My 
sister has very little time left in this world, as her health has taken a major hit 
from this injustice. Please move fast. 
Under penalty of perjury, I swear that the information contained herein is true 
and corre \to._ the best of my knowledge. 
l · .· ; 
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